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NOTES
JACKSON REANALYZED: PREVENTING TAX-FREE
ESCAPE UPON TRANSFER OF A PARTNERSHIP
INTEREST
For the past thirty years, courts have wrestled with the problem
of calculating gain when a taxpayer transfers property Most of the
struggles have centered on interpreting and applying the landmark
United States Supreme Court decision Crane v. Commissioner' A
recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, Jackson v. Commissioner,2 exemplifies the confu-
sion in this area.
In Crane, the Supreme Court held that the amount realized
upon the sale of mortgaged property includes the face amount of
the mortgage as well as the cash paid by the buyer.3 Crane, how-
ever, addressed only the treatment of debt for which the taxpayer
was not personally liable: nonrecourse liability 4 Jackson addressed
a different question-the calculation of gain upon the transfer of
property encumbered by a debt for which the transferor remains
responsible as a guarantor: 5 recourse liability The confused analy-
sis of the decision inadvertently opened an escape hatch from
"leaky" tax shelters.6
1. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
1. 2. 708 F.2d 1402 (9th Cir. 1983).
3. 331 U.S. at 11, 12; see infra note 71 and text accompanying notes 7-22.
4. Nonrecourse liability is a "[t]ype of security loan which bars the lender from action
against the [personal assets of the borrower] if the security value falls below the amount
required to repay the loan." BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY 953 (5th ed. 1979). In partnerships,
the type of liability is important because it determines the proportion of each partner's
liability. Nonrecourse liabilities are allocated in the ratio that profits are shared because
these liabilities are repaid, if at all, from the profits of the partnership. The partners are not
obligated personally to repay nonrecourse liability. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956). Recourse
liabilities obligate a partner for personal repayment in the event that the partnership's as-
sets are insufficient. Recourse liability is allocated in the ratio that losses are shared because
the risk of repayment is borne by the partners in that proportion.
5. 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1419-23 (1981).
6. A "leaky" tax shelter is one that has stopped generating losses and has begun produc-
ing profit. The term is borrowed from Professor Martin Ginsburg. See generally Ginsburg,
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This Note examines the tax consequences of the transfer of a
partnership interest encumbered by recourse liability. The Note
first reviews Crane and discusses the decision's rationale. The Note
then focuses on the interpretive errors in Jackson and the likely
ramifications of that decision. The Note concludes that existing
statutory alternatives embodying Crane's principles effectively




Crane established important principles regarding the tax treat-
ment of property encumbered by debt. Mrs. Crane inherited an
apartment building from her husband. The building's appraised
value equalled precisely the amount of the attached mortgage.7
Mrs. Crane never assumed personal liability for the mortgage., She
operated the rental property for seven years and deducted the de-
preciation as an operating expense on the building, calculating the
depreciation based on the inclusion of the amount of the mortgage
in her basis.' A buyer then purchased the building, giving Mrs.
Crane a small amount of cash and taking the building subject to
the mortgage.
Mrs. Crane argued that her basis in the property equalled the
excess of the building's value over the amount of the mortgage.10
The Leaky Tax Shelter, 53 TAxEs 719 (1975). See infra note 15 and text accompanying
notes 15-19 for a detailed discussion of tax shelters.
7. 331 U.S. at 3.
8. Id. at 3-4.
9. Basis represents a taxpayer's capital investment in property. Therefore, an asset's ini-
tial basis is usually its cost. I.R.C. § 1012 (1982). During the life of an asset, further capital
investment along with improvement of the asset generate additions to basis and deprecia-
tion generates deductions from basis, both requiring adjustments. I.R.C. § 1016(a)(1)-(2)
(1982). Individuals may deduct the operating expenses of their rental property from the
rental revenues that the property generates to determine the amount of rental income to be
included in their personal taxable income. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1982) Depreciation is a deducti-
ble business expense that is calculated by prorating the cost of the asset (its basis) over a
period of years. See I.R.C. § 167 (West 1982 & Supp. 1984).
10. 331 U.S. at 3. Mrs. Crane's argument regarding her basis is inconsistent with the de-
preciation deductions that she took. Her argument assumed a zero basis. Depreciation rep-
resents merely an annual cost allocation of basis. Thus, if Mrs. Crane followed her own




Because the appraised value equalled the amount of the mortgage,
her equity was zero when she inherited the property and thus her
basis also was zero. She maintained that the $2500 cash realized
upon sale less her zero basis was her taxable gain on the sale.1
The Supreme Court rejected Mrs. Crane's arguments. It held
that the amount realized upon the sale of mortgaged property in-
cluded the face amount of the mortgage as well as the cash paid by
the buyer. 2 The Court thus calculated Mrs. Crane's gain by sub-
tracting her basis in the building from the total of the cash re-
ceived plus the mortgage.13 The Court's holding is based on the
further corresponding holding that, if mortgage liability is included
in the amount realized upon sale, it must be included in the seller's
basis when acquired.' 4
Crane allows an investor to include debt financing as part of an
asset's basis upon which depreciation is calculated. This provides
the foundation of the tax shelter.' 5 Taxpayers buy property with
11. Id. at 4.
12. Id. at 13.
13. Id. at 11, 14. The amounts that Mrs. Crane had deducted for depreciation reduced her
basis and thus increased her taxable gain upon sale. Mrs. Crane's gain exceeded her net cash
proceeds by the same amount that her total depreciation deductions exceeded her original
basis net of the mortgage. Thus, the gain on sale essentially accounted for the depreciation
deductions.
14. Id. at 10.
15. Tax shelters have been described as
investment devices by which an individual obtains an immediate and usually
substantial reduction in the amount of tax on income he already has and upon
which he would but for obtaining the "tax shelter" have to pay tax. He thus in
effect is investing the government's tax dollars rather than his own
money. . . . The essence of a tax shelter is the deferral or postponement of tax
on current income, accomplished by accelerating future deductions into the
current taxable year. Under the present tax accounting rules, in a taxable year
in which the taxpayer has already received substantial income in excess of that
year's deductions, he can avoid paying tax on all or part of that income by
making an investment, prior to the end of the year, which will produce income
in succeeding taxable years, but which will in the current year produce only
deductions in the form of an artificial "loss."
In such cases, the major emphasis may be on the tax "loss" and the resulting
tax saving on the participant's existing income from other and unrelated
sources. Since the anticipated tax saving on the participant's other income may
equal or exceed the amount of his cash investment in the "tax shelter",
economic flaws in the investment itself may be ignored because he is investing
tax dollars.
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borrowed money and small personal investment. Because the
amount of the mortgage is included in the basis, the taxpayer re-
ceives a basis disproportionately higher than his own investment.
Further, the tax shelter may generate deductions that are large
enough to offset ordinary income from other sources.'" Because the
property is heavily mortgaged, the taxpayer receives a dispropor-
tionately high after-tax return on his own funds.17 The tax shelter
thus generates deductions that 6ffset ordinary income from other
sources.
Although the inclusion of mortgage liability in basis makes the
tax shelter possible, it does not produce a total windfall for the
investor. Under Crane, upon sale of the property, the taxpayer
must include the amount of the outstanding debt as part of the
amount realized.' 8 The taxable gain upon sale offsets the deprecia-
U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY PROPOSALS FOR TAX CHANGES 95 (Apr. 30, 1973), reprinted in
Public Hearings on the Subject of General Tax Reform before House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6997 (1973).
16. Accelerated depreciation methods provide larger depreciation deductions in the early
years of asset ownership than does the straight line method, which evenly allocates the cost
of the asset over its useful life. See generally W. WESTPHAL, ACCOUNTANT'S TAX PRACTICE
HANDBOOK 137-38 (1978).
17. See generally Note, Tax Consequences of the Disposition of Property Subject to an
Unassumed Mortgage, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 845 (1949). Note also that sale of the shelter itself
may be taxed at capital gains rates. An individual is allowed a 60% deduction on long term
capital gains. Section 1221 of the Code indirectly defines a capital asset by describing those
items that are not capital assets. Therefore, all other assets held by a taxpayer are by defini-
tion capital assets. The principal assets excluded from the definition of a capital asset are
inventory and business fixed assets. The principal capital assets held by an individual tax-
payer include personal use assets such as a residence or an automobile and assets held for
investment purposes. Gain or loss upon sale of these assets is capital rather than ordinary.
18. For example, assume that a taxpayer purchases a building with a fair market value of
$100,000 for $50,000 cash and a $50,000 ten-year nonrecourse mortgage. Assume also that
the purchaser uses straight line depreciation and the useful life of the building is ten years.
The taxpayer then sells the property for $80,000 after five years and the purchaser assumes
the mortgage. Over the five years that the taxpayer owns the property, he is allowed to take
depreciation deductions as follows:
CASH PAID $ 50,000




ON THE STRAIGHT LINE METHOD
FOR PROPERTY WITH A TEN
YEAR USEFUL LIFE x10%
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tion deductions.19 Thus, the shelter merely defers the investor's tax
obligations.
The Court's analysis in Crane is the subject of ongoing debate.20
The opinion set forth two analyses supporting inclusion of nonre-
course debt in basis and amount realized.21 Courts and commenta-
ANNUAL DEPRECIATION
AMOUNT 10,000
NUMBER OF YEARS PROPERTY
HELD x5
TOTAL DEPRECIATION AT
TIME OF SALE $ 50,000
NOTE: Half of the $50,000 depreciation deducted over the five
years ($25,000) is due to the inclusion of mortgage debt
in the original basis of the asset. Crane thus provides a
tax benefit in the form of larger depreciation deductions.
Upon the sale of the property, the building's basis is $50,000 (original cost less deprecia-
tion). Under Crane, the amount realized upon sale is computed as follows:
CASH RECEIVED $ 80,000
OUTSTANDING MORTGAGE
DEBT ASSUMED 25,000
TOTAL AMOUNT REALIZED $105,000
LESS: ADJUSTED BASIS OF
THE BUILDING AT THE
TIME OF SALE 50,000
TAXABLE GAIN $ 55,000
The inclusion of the outstanding debt in the seller's amount realized increased his gain by
$25,000 and essentially recaptures the extra $25,000 depreciation that was allowed because
of the inclusion of the mortgage debt in the original basis. If the depreciation benefit is not
accounted for by including debt in amount realized upon sale of the property, the taxpayer
would have received a dual benefit from the debt: extra depreciation and smaller gain upon
sale.
19. The gain resulting from including nonrecourse debt in amount realized sometimes is
termed a "phantom gain" because it does not arise from the type of consideration that
usually comprises amount realized, such as cash and the buyer's assumption of personal
liabilities. See W. ANDREws, BASIc FEDERAL INcolsx TAxATION 523 (2d ed. 1979).
20. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Tufts, 103 S. Ct. 1826 (1983), rev'g 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir.
1981), rev'g 70 T.C. 756 (1978). The case was remanded. See 712 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1983).
21. 331 U.S. at 13-16. Referring to the rationales, an imaginary Supreme Court opined:
"It would have been better had [they] stopped [before stating the two rationales] .... On
both counts we were sadly misled." Adams, Exploring the Outer Boundaries of the Crane
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tors have labelled these approaches the "economic benefit" and the
"double deduction" theories.22
The Economic Benefit Theory
The economic benefit theory discussed in Crane extended the
settled rule that a purchaser's assumption of a taxpayer's recourse
liability benefits the taxpayer in "as real and substantial [a sense]
as if the money had been paid [to the taxpayer] and then paid over
by [the taxpayer] to its creditors. '23 The Court in Crane suggested
that the sale of property subject to nonrecourse debt constitutes
an actual economic benefit to the taxpayer as well, even though the
taxpayer retains no personal liability for the debt.
The Court realized that, because a lender can foreclose the mort-
gage, nonrecourse debt essentially imposes personal liability on the
property owner. A foreclosure would make the property owner lose
his equity. The borrower therefore will treat the debt as if he were
personally liable to avoid foreclosure.24
The economic benefit rationale has serious flaws, however. Most
notably, it breaks down when the property value is less than the
amount of the mortgage.25 Further, unlike recourse debt in which
personal liability persists, nonrecourse obligations do not concern
the taxpayer after sale or abandonment of the property.26 This dif-
ference exists because the transferor retains no liability after the
Doctrine; An Imaginary Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAX L. REV. 159, 175 (1966).
22. See, e.g., Tufts, 103 S. Ct. at 1831-32; Del Cotto, Basis and Amount Realized Under
CRANE: A Current View of Some Tax Effects in Mortgage Financing, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 69,
85 (1969).
23. United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564, 566 (1938).
24. 331 U.S. at 14.
25. See Del Cotto, supra note 22, at 85. If the value of the property is less than the
mortgage, the sale of the property cannot satisfy the mortgage. In this situation, the tax-
payer would not realize an economic benefit upon disposition of the property because he
would not have built any equity to protect. Further, because the debt is nonrecourse, the
discharge itself would confer no benefit because the taxpayer never incurred personal liabil-
ity. The Court's oft-cited footnote 37 in Crane explicitly recognized this situation as
presenting a different question that the Court declined to consider. See 331 U.S. at 14.
Thus, even if the economic benefit rationale is persuasive within the factual context of
Crane, it does not explain other situations easily.
26. See Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt and the Crane Case, 33 TAX L. REV.
277, 281-82 (1978). But see Newman, The Resurgence of Footnote 37: Tufts v. Commis-
sioner, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 12 (1982).
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sale. Professor Bittker perceptively viewed the economic benefit
rationale as merely a semantic result of the Court being forced to
choose between three alternatives in distinguishing nonrecourse
and recourse obligations.27
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
cently discredited the economic benefit theory in Tufts v. Commis-
sioner.2 s The court agreed that the appeal of the theory diminishes
when the taxpayer does not want to keep the property.29 Although
the Supreme Court's reversal did not expressly reject the economic
benefit approach, the Court limited the theory to the facts of
Crane.30
The Double Deduction Theory
Courts and commentators also have debated the proper interpre-
tation of the double deduction theory.3 1 The Court advocated in-
27. See Bittker, supra note 26, at 282. The alternatives were: (1) to draw a distinct line
between nonrecourse and recourse obligations; (2) to create a system of case-by-case scru-
tiny; or (3) to provide uniform treatment of both types of liability. Id. The first alternative
would create problems in situations where no practical difference exists. For example, a real
estate holding company's only substantial asset is mortgaged property so personal liability
adds little to the debtor's security. Id. Case-by-case analysis generally is disfavored because
it increases the administrative burden on the courts and establishes no clear standards for
economic decisions. Id. By treating recourse and nonrecourse debt similarly, the Court was
forced to adopt the economic benefit fiction to support its approach. Professor Bittker sug-
gested that if the Court admitted that it was choosing administrative simplicity, much fu-
ture confusion could have been eliminated. Id.
28. 651 F.2d 1058, 1062 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1826 (1983).
29. If the taxpayer decides, for any reason whatsoever, that he no longer wants
the burdens and responsibilities that accompany ownership, he can transfer
the property to a third party with absolutely no regard for that party's willing-
ness or ability to meet the mortgage obligations, yet rest assured that his other
assets cannot be reached.
Id. This freedom to market wholly undermines the support for the economic benefit theory.
30. 103 S. Ct. at 1831.
31. See, e.g., id. at 1831-34; Bittker, Tax Shelters, supra note 26, at 282. The term
"double deduction" apparently was derived from Judge Learned Hand, the author of the
court of appeals opinion in Crane, who reasoned:
[U]nless the "adjusted value" of the buildings is not computed upon the
same [fair market] value in finding the subtrahend in the equation of gain [ad-
justed basis], the taxpayer gets a double deduction. By hypothesis [the tax-
payer] will have been allowed deductions seriatim, based upon the actual value
of the buildings; and he will in addition have got a reduction in his gain to the
extent to which actual "wear and tear" has reduced the selling price. Manifest
justice demands that he must surrender one or the other ....
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cluding Mrs. Crane's outstanding mortgage in her amount realized
because she received the benefit of including the mortgage in her
basis during earlier years.32 The larger basis allowed her to deduct
depreciation in excess of her actual cash investment in the prop-
erty. Including the mortgage in basis for the calculation of depreci-
ation required that it be offset by including it in the amount real-
ized upon sale. This approach prevents the taxpayer from receiving
depreciation tax benefits without recapture in the form of gain
upon sale.33
Tufts was a recent attempt to apply the double deduction ra-
tionale. The court in Tufts considered whether the Crane rule ap-
plies when the unpaid amount of nonrecourse debt exceeds the fair
market value of the property sold.3 1 In Tufts, each partner in-
cluded in the basis for his partnership interest his proportionate
share of a $1,850,000 nonrecourse mortgage note, the proceeds of
which were used to finance construction of an apartment com-
plex. 5 At the time the partners sold their partnership interests,
the balance of the mortgage note remained $1,850,000, but the fair
market value of the apartment complex, which secured the note,
had declined to $1,400,000.36 The adjusted basis of the apartment
complex was approximately $1,455,000.37 The government argued
that the full amount of the nonrecourse mortgage of $1,850,000
153 F.2d 504, 505 (2d Cir. 1945).
32. See 331 U.S. at 14.
33. Id. As the court of appeals stated in Crane, the mortgagor "should be compelled to
take the transaction as a whole, including such past advantages as he may have been enti-
tled to as allowances for depreciation." 153 F.2d at 506.
34. 103 S. Ct. at 1831-36. In Crane the Supreme Court held that on the sale of property
encumbered with a nonrecourse liability in which the value of the property equals or ex-
ceeds the liability, the liability must be included in the amount realized on the sale. In the
celebrated footnote 37, the Court made the following reservation:
Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount of the mort-
gage, a mortgagor who is not personally liable cannot realize a benefit equal to
the mortgage. Consequently, a different problem might be encountered where a
mortgagor abandoned the property or transferred it subject to the mortgage
without receiving boot. That is not this case.
331 U.S. at 14 n.37.
35. 651 F.2d at 1059.
36. Id.
37. In 1971 and 1972, each partner claimed depreciation deductions amounting to an ag-
gregate total of $108,035, which, along with the operating losses, reduced the basis of the
property to $1,455,000 at the time of sale. 70 T.C. 750, 769-78 (1978).
[Vol. 26:317
JACKSON REANALYZED
had to be included in their amount realized on the sale. 8 The tax-
payers contended that the amount of the mortgage includible in
the amount realized was limited to the fair market value of the
property, $1,400,000.39
The Tax Court held that the amount realized included the full
amount of debt because of the taxpayers' earlier depreciation de-
ductions. 40 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit reversed. 41 Relying on Crane's footnote 37,42 the court held
that a taxpayer's amount realized upon the disposition of property
subject to a nonrecourse debt is limited to the fair market value of
that property. 43 The court refused to extend Crane and rejected
both of its rationales.44 Specifically, the court professed "uncer-
tainty as to the exact nature of the double deductions."45 This un-
certainty was evident in the court's discussion of the double deduc-
tion theory.
The court stated that any tax benefits received in the form of
deductions already had been factored into the gain equation
through the corresponding downward adjustment of basis.46 As a
result, the Court reasoned that inclusion of the debt in the amount
realized would expand unnecessarily the amount realized and lead
to double taxation.47 This analysis is seriously flawed, however, be-
cause reduction of basis does not sufficiently account for tax bene-
fits in the gain equation.48
38. 651 F.2d at 1059.
39. Id.
40. 70 T.C. at 769-70.
41. 651 F.2d at 1063.
42. Id. Courts previously had ignored this footnote. Courts encountering this issue uni-
formly held that the taxpayer's amount realized on the disposition of the property included
the full amount of the debt. See, e.g., Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212, 214-16 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978); Woodsam Assocs. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357,
358 (2d Cir. 1952); Estate of Delman v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 15, 29-30 (1979).
43. 651 F.2d at 1063.
44. The court rejected the economic benefit theory as "seriously flawed." Id. at 1062; see
supra text accompanying notes 25-30.
45. 651 F.2d at 1060 n.4.
46. Id. at 1061.
47. Id.
48. The court misinterpreted the "double deduction" problem. The opinion assumes that
basis adjustment required for depreciation by section 1016 of the Code will increase the
taxpayer's gain on sale, thereby accounting for prior deductions (i.e. gain is equal to the
difference between amount realized and basis, and therefore any decrease in basis increases
19851
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The Supreme Court reinstated the Tax Court decision. The
Court ruled that the fair market value of the property did not limit
the amount of debt that must be included in amount realized.49
The decision rested on the need for symmetry between inclusion of
nonrecourse debt in the taxpayer's basis and in his amount
realized.50
Crane: A Balancing Entry Theory
Interpreting Crane as resting on a balancing entry concept pro-
vides a sounder, more flexible analysis for applying Crane. The
concept obviates the narrower, attenuated economic benefit and
double deduction theories. Professor Bittker proposed viewing the
balancing entry as a form of correlative adjustment. 5' He realized
this difference and thus increases the gain). But this does not resolve the double deduction
problem. The reduction of basis does not have any tax consequences until the time of sale.
Failure to include debt in amount realized will produce, at minimum, a smaller gain and in
many instances a loss upon sale. Reduction of basis does not produce the requisite gain
upon sale if the taxpayer's amount realized is less than his reduced basis. The outstanding
amount of the debt that was included in the taxpayer's depreciable basis must be included
in amount realized to mitigate the problem. For a numerical example, see supra note 18.
49. 103 S. Ct. at 1831. The Court adopted section 1.1001-2 of the Treasury Regulations by
holding that when nonrecourse debt is included in basis the face amount of the liability
must be treated as amount realized, even if the face amount exceeds the fair market value of
the property at the time of the sale or exchange. Id.
50. Symmetric treatment prevents a tax loss which does not represent economic loss and
thus prevents frustration of the tax laws. Id. at 1834. The Court interpreted Crane as rest-
ing on a economic benefit theory, but limited that approach to the facts of Crane. Id.; see
supra note 18. Assume, for example, that a taxpayer purchases a building with a fair market
value of $100,000 for $30,000 cash and a nonrecourse mortgage of $70,000. Assume also that
the taxpayer uses straight line depreciation, that the building has a ten-year useful life, and
that the taxpayer does not make any payments of principal on the nonrecourse note. Then
assume that the taxpayer sells the building after five years for $20,000 cash.
The taxpayer has an actual loss of $10,000 ($20,000 cash received less $30,000 paid) on the
transaction. Under Crane, the taxpayer's adjusted basis would be $50,000 ($100,000 less
$10,000 depreciation per year for five years) and the amount realized on the sale would be
$90,000 ($20,000 cash plus $70,000 assumption of mortgage by purchaser). The taxable gain
upon disposition would be $40,000 ($90,000 amount realized less $50,000 adjusted basis).
But the taxpayer already has received the benefit of $50,000 in depreciation deductions,
making his overall tax loss $10,000, which agrees with his actual out-of-pocket loss.
If, however, the taxpayer's amount realized equals only the $20,000 cash received, then he
realizes a $30,000 tax loss in addition to the $50,000 depreciation he has taken. This does
not conform with the transaction's actual result, an out-of-pocket loss of $10,000.
51. Bittker, supra note 26, at 282.
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that the economic benefit rationale of Crane was unpersuasive, 52
but acknowledged that the Court's decision was justifiable because
it harmonized the tax consequences of the taxpayer's property
dealings with economic reality.5 3 Bittker suggested that "the value
ascribed to the alleged relief she obtained from a liability for which
she was not liable was, at bottom, a balancing entry that was ap-
propriate if-but only if-viewed in its tax context." 54
When a taxpayer buys property with borrowed funds, he in-
cludes the amount of the debt in the asset's basis. The borrowed
funds are excluded from the debtor's income because the Code as-
sumes that the debtor must repay the loan.5 Similarly, a taxpayer
deducts depreciation from basis because the Code assumes that the
deductions restore the taxpayer's capital outlay. When a taxpayer
transfers the asset, however, both assumptions fail. The taxpayer
makes no further capital outlay and need not repay the debt.57
Thus, "a balancing entry [inclusion of the outstanding debt in
amount realized to trigger taxable gain]-is required when the tax-
payer closes his account with the Internal Revenue Service by dis-
posing of his property. . ". ." ' The balancing entry, then, is essen-
tially a reversal required because of changed circumstances.
The balancing entry approach represents a necessary counter-
weight to the annual accounting principle.5 9 Courts long ago recog-
nized that annual tax returns are required because the government
needs ascertainable revenue at regular intervals.6 0 Taxpayers are
unable to predict the future when they take deductions because
transactions often develop over more than a single year. If an as-
sumption underlying the initial deduction later proves erroneous,




54. Id. (emphasis added).




59. Estate of Munter v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 663, 678 (1975) (concurring opinion).
60. Commissioner v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 365 (1931).
61. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Anders, 414 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 958 (1969).
1985]
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The Supreme Court also adopted a balancing entry theory in
Tufts, citing Bittker's analysis. 6 2 Although the Court claimed that
its approach differed from the Crane rule and the tax benefit
rule,13 this is merely an exercise in semantics as Justice Blackmun
indicates in his dissent in Hillsboro National Bank."
The balancing entry approach adequately articulates the ration-
ale underlying Crane and the tax benefit theory. A debtor origi-
nally receives the proceeds of a loan tax-free based on the assump-
tion that he incurred an obligation to repay the debt. The debtor
also can include the amount of the debt to determine the basis of
an asset. An adjustment is required when later events contradict
the assumption that the taxpayer will repay the debt.
Depreciation deductions presuppose economic investment. If the
purchaser of property borrows money to pay the purchase price, a
firm obligation to invest presumably exists. When the taxpayer
subsequently transfers the property, depreciation deductions have
generated a benefit that the taxpayer will never repay through the
investment of capital. The taxpayer cannot ignore the tax benefit
of the depreciation deductions when calculating gain upon disposi-
tion of the property. Unless the amount realized includes the out-
standing amount of the debt, the debtor will have received not
only untaxed income when he received the loan proceeds but also
an unwarranted increase in the basis of his property. A balancing
entry that includes the outstanding debt in the amount realized
provides the proper tax treatment.
62. 103 S. Ct. at 1832.
63. Id. at n.8. The tax benefit rule mandates taking the recovery or collection of amounts
previously deducted unless the prior deduction produced no tax benefit because it did not
reduce the tax liability. Apparently, the Crane rule has evolved as a corollary to the tax
benefit rule. See generally Jones & Pratt, The Minimum Tax: Tax Preference Items and
the Tax Benefit Rule, 55 TAXES 321 (1977); Tye, The Tax Benefit Doctrine Reexamined, 3
TAX L. REV. 329 (1948); Note, The Tax Benefit Rule, Claim of Right Restorations, and
Annual Accounting: A Cure for the Inconsistencies, 21 VAND. L. REV. 995 (1968).
64. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 103 S. Ct. 1134, 1164 (1983). Justice Blackmun
viewed the tax benefit rule narrowly and prescribed making the necessary adjustment by
amending the original return rather than treating the recovery as income in the year of the
adjustment. 103 S. Ct. at 1164-65. Blackmun's narrow view of the tax benefit rule may ex-
plain why he attempts to distinguish the rule from the seemingly similar approach that he
took in his Tufts opinion. Tufts, Crane, and the tax benefit rule all are based on a balancing
entry theory. The balancing entry is required because the original assumption that the
debtor incurred an obligation to repay has later proved unfounded.
328 [Vol. 26:317
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In Tufts the Court recently suggested acceptance of a balancing
entry approach as the rationale behind Crane.65 Therefore, the bal-
ancing entry concept provides a sounder, more flexible analysis for
applying Crane. The concept obviates the narrower economic ben-
efit and double deduction theories. Jackson involved the applica-
tion of Crane's principles to the transfer of a partnership interest.
Again, the confusion concerning the tax treatment of the transfer
of an asset that is encumbered by debt stems from varying inter-
pretations of Crane. Courts that are presented with cases similar
to Jackson in the future first must understand that the balancing
entry theory calls for taxation upon transfer of the partnership in-
terest. The courts then are free to apply statutory alternatives to
calculate the taxable gain.
JACKSON V. COMMISSIONER
Donald Jackson, a tax lawyer, and Living Environmentals, Inc.
(LEI), a builder, each owned a fifty-percent interest in a joint ven-
ture6 to construct apartments. Louis F. Del Castillo controlled the
stock of LEI. In September 1972, Jackson and Del Castillo individ-
ually signed a promissory note for a short-term loan from Wells
Fargo Bank to cover the capital costs of the joint venture.61 Later,
Jackson decided to have his wholly owned corporation, Housing
Specialists, Inc. (HSI), act as his agent in business transactions to
avoid the appearance of competition with his law firm's builder cli-
ents.6 8 Jackson became an undisclosed principal69 as a result of the
agency relationship. HSI then obtained a $795,000 permanent con-
65. 103 S. Ct. at 1832.
66. A joint venture differs from a partnership only because it is formed to carry out a
particular business transaction and is expected to have a fixed duration (dissolution follows
completion of the enterprise). H. HENN, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND OTHER UNINCORPORATED
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 279-80 (1972). A joint venture is considered a type of partnership
under Subchapter K of the Code; partnership taxation principles apply to joint ventures.
I.R.C. § 761(a) (1982).
67. 42 T.C.M. at 1413 (1981).
68. Id. at 1413-14.
69. Id. "If the other party has no notice that the agent is acting for a principal, the one
for whom he acts is an undisclosed principal." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 4(3)
(1958). This status depends on the manifestations of the principal or agent and the knowl-
edge of the other party at the time of the transaction. Id. comment C. The legal relations of
a third person with respect to a principal or agent depend on this status. Id. comment A.
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struction loan from Gilbralter Savings & Loan Association. Jack-
son, as president of HSI, and Del Castillo, as president of LEI,
signed the loan. Jackson also guaranteed this loan personally. 0
The joint venture relationship was not mentioned in either the Gil-
bralter or the Wells Fargo loan documents.7 '
Jackson and LEI signed a formal joint venture agreement in No-
vember 1972. The agreement stated that the purpose of the Wells
Fargo loan was to assist in financing the joint venture and that the
loan constituted capital requiring repayment by the joint venture
before any distribution of income to the venturers.72 The agree-
ment also acknowledged that the Gilbralter loan was obtained for
the joint venture. 73 The lenders were not notified of the joint ven-
ture agreement. The joint venture reported a loss of $36,222.51 on
its 1972 partnership tax return. 4 Jackson's allocated share75 of the
loss was $18,111.26 and he claimed this loss on his individual tax
return. The joint venture's partnership tax return reflected the
outstanding balances of the two loans as liabilities.76
On January 3, 1973, Jackson assigned his one-half interest in the
joint venture to HSI, his wholly owned corporation. This assign-
ment abolished the agency relationship.7 Jackson viewed the
transaction both as a complete termination of his individual inter-
70. 42 T.C.M. at 1414.
71. Id.
72. Section 1.17 of the joint venture agreement discussed the capital accounts of each
joint venturer and stated in part: "all such sums contributed to the Joint Venture shall
constitute capital and shall be repaid to WELLS FARGO BANK prior to the distribution to
a Joint Venturer or any principal shareholder or employee of the Joint Venturer of any
income or net profits or any other amounts whatsoever." Id.
73. Id. at 1415 (citing Exhibit A of the joint venture agreement).
74. Id. at 1414.
75. A partnership's taxable income is calculated similarly to that of an individual. A part-
nership is not treated, however, as a separate taxable entity. Rather, certain items of in-
come, gain, loss, deduction and credit are passed through to the partners and are included
in their individual returns. Each distributive share of these items generally is determined by
the partnership agreement. See I.R.C. §§ 701, 702, 704 (1982); see generally 1 & 2 A. WIL-
LIS, J. PENNEL & P. POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 1 71, 81, 82 (3d ed. 1983); 1 W.
McKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS,
1.01, 1-1 to 1-4 (1977).
76. The total amount of the loans outstanding on December 31, 1972, was $422,450 (Wells
Fargo = $24,950; Gilbralter = $397,500). The entire amount borrowed from the Wells
Fargo Bank was repaid by the joint venture in 1973.
77. 42 T.C.M. at 1415.
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est in the joint venture with LEI and as a contribution to HSI's
capital.7" Jackson received no additional stock when he transferred
his partnership interest.79 Following the assignment, HSI exercised
all managerial powers originally held by Jackson. As a joint ven-
turer, HSI had authority to bind the joint venture and had an
equal right to possession of property for joint venture purposes.8 0
A dispute arose over the ability of the government to tax Jack-
son on the transfer of his interest in the joint venture. The Com-
missioner argued that HSI's assumption of Jackson's joint venture
liabilities constituted a sale or exchange under section 1001(a).81
The Commissioner also argued that this transfer was a taxable
gain s2 to the extent that the transferred liabilities exceeded Jack-
son's basis in the joint venture.8 3
78. Id. (referring to the minutes of an HSI board meeting).
79. This fact affects the determination of whether the transfer constituted a sale or ex-
change. Qualification as a sale or exchange is necessary for sections 752(d) or 351 of the
Code to apply. See infra text accompanying notes 141-43 and 145-49.
80. 42 T.C.M. at 1415.
81. Id. at 1418.
82. Section 1001(a) of the Code provides in part that "[t]he gain from the sale or other
disposition of property shall be the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the ad-
justed basis provided in section 1011 for determining gain." Section 1001(b) of the Code
defines the amount realized from the sale or other disposition of property as "the sum of
any money received plus the fair market value of the property (other than money) re-
ceived." I.R.C. § 1001(b) (1982).
83. 42 T.C.M. at 1418. Section 1.1001-2(a) of the Treasury Regulations specifically pro-
vides that the amount realized upon sale or other disposition of property includes the
amount of liabilities from which the transferor is discharged. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)
(1980). The Tax Court ruled that the regulation was not applicable because it had not been
adopted during the years in question. Id. at 1417 n.6. In his brief, the Commissioner argued
that this regulation merely interpreted existing law and should be given retroactive effect.
The court of appeals never addressed this issue.
The Commissioner argued that Jackson's taxable gain should be calculated as follows:
CALCULATION OF JACKSON'S BASIS
IN HIS P/S INTEREST
Contributions to Capital
50% share of P/S Liabilities
/2 Gilbralter loan $397,500
/2 Wells Fargo loan 24,950
Cash -0-
422,450
Allocated Share of 1972 P/S Losses (18,111)
Jackson's Basis in his P/S Interest $404,339
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The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner.s4 The court ruled
that the joint venture was not primarily obligated to extinguish
Jackson's liability because the lenders had not been notified of the
joint venture relationship.8 5 Thus, the obligation of the joint ven-
ture to pay the debt did not provide Jackson any basis because
Jackson remained individually liable to the lenders.8 6 The court
also ruled, however, that Jackson's contribution of the loan pro-
ceeds to the joint venture created a joint venture liability and his
share of this liability provided his basis.8 ' The court reasoned fur-
ther that because HSI replaced Jackson, thereby becoming a party
to joint venture liabilities, that transaction constituted a sale or
exchange. 8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed. 9 The court interpreted the Tax Court's calculation of gain
as based on an amount realized to Jackson arising from a relief
from liability.90 The court of appeals focused on Jackson's contin-
ued liability as guarantor and held that because Jackson was not
relieved from liability, he received no consideration.9" Thus, Jack-
son realized no gain from the transaction with HSI."
CALCULATION OF JACKSON'S GAIN UPON
TRANSFER OF HIS P/S INTEREST
Jackson's Amount Realized
(reduction in share of P/S liabilities) $422,450
Jackson's Basis in his P/S Interest (404,339)
Jackson's Taxable Gain $ 18,111
42 T.C.M. at 1418.
84. 42 T.C.M. at 1423.
85. Id. at 1420-21. The joint venture agreement had to be in writing to obligate the joint
venture to pay the debt upon which Jackson was personally liable. The written agreement
was not yet effective when the loans were secured and the lenders were not notified in writ-
ing of the agreement as required by section 1624(2) of the California Civil Code. See CAL.
Civ. CODE § 1624(2) (West 1982). Thus, under California law, Jackson remained personally
liable to the lenders.
86. 42 T.C.M. at 1423.
87. Id. at 1421.
88. Id. at 1423; see infra note 118 and text accompanying notes 111-18.
89. See 708 F.2d 1402, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1983).
90. Id. at 1404.
91. 708 F.2d at 1404. Although the joint venture had contractually agreed to pay off the
loans, under California law, Jackson retained liability to the lenders as guarantor. See infra
text accompanying notes 97-103.
92. 708 F.2d at 1404.
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This decision allowed Jackson to transfer his encumbered part-
nership interest tax-free.93 Because a loan is not a taxable transac-
tion, Jackson received the benefit of the tax-free use of the bor-
rowed funds. He also received larger individual depreciation
deductions while involved with the partnership because he was al-
lowed to include the liabilities as part of the adjusted basis of the
partnership property. In both instances, the tax benefits stemmed
from the assumption that Jackson would repay the loans. Conse-
quently, when Jackson transferred his partnership interest he
should have been required to account to the government for the
earlier benefits in the form of taxable gain.
Jackson may have potentially serious ramifications. Investors in
tax shelters will attempt to apply Jackson to avoid taxes on tax
shelters that have begun to produce income. Investors could retain
guarantor liability on the shelter debt and transfer the shelter as-
sets to a controlled corporation, thus escaping taxation. Before an-
alyzing Jackson and the specific statutory provisions available, an
overview of the pertinent general partnership tax provisions is
necessary.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE PARTNERSHIP TAXATION STATUTORY
FRAMEWORK
Early provisions regarding partnership taxation were superficial
and ambiguous.94 In 1954 Congress significantly expanded and
codified the rules regarding partnership transactions in Subchapter
K of the Internal Revenue Code.9" To calculate the gain or loss on
the sale or exchange of partnership interests, Subchapter K adopts
an entity approach.96 The transferor does not compute his gain or
93. Upon the sale or exchange of a partnership interest, section 741 of the Code specifi-
cally provides that gain or loss will be recognized to the transferor partner. See I.R.C. § 741
(1982).
94. Willis, Old & New Frontiers in Partnerships: A Review and Look Ahead, 20 INST. ON
FED TAX'N 699, 700 (1962).
95. I.R.C. §§ 701-71 (West 1982 & Supp. 1984).
96. A. WILLIS, WILLIS ON PARTNERSHIP TAXATION, § 1.03 (1971). The conflict of whether to
view the partnership as an aggregate of individuals who have pooled their property or as a
separate distinct entity has continued for several hundred years. Subchapter K adopts
neither theory exclusively. Rather, Subchapter K takes a result-oriented approach and ap-
plies the theory that produces the desired result.
Subchapter K predominantly employs the entity concept of partnership but recognizes
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loss separately for each partnership asset. Rather, he treats his
partnership interest as a single intangible asset with an adjusted
basis separate from the basis of the individual partnership assets.17
Sections 741 and 1001 of the Code govern the income tax conse-
quences of the sale or disposition of a partnership interest. Section
741 provides that a partner will recognize a gain or loss upon the
sale or exchange of his partnership interest. Section 752 provides
specifically for the treatment of liabilities in connection with the
sale of a partnership interest. Section 752(d) states that liabilities
should be treated the same as liabilities associated with the sale or
exchange of any other property.
Generally, gain or loss from the sale or disposition of property
equals the difference between the amount realized from the sale
and the adjusted basis of the property transferred.98 The amount
realized upon the sale of a partnership interest is calculated in the
same manner as on the sale of other property. The amount realized
includes the sum of the money paid by the purchaser and the fair
market value of any other property received by the selling part-
ner.e9 Further, a Treasury Regulation" 0 mandates treating a liabil-
ity of the transferor that is assumed by the purchaser as an
amount realized. 101
When a partner calculates his gain or loss upon sale or exchange
of his partnership interest, he also must include his share of part-
nership liabilities to determine the adjusted basis of his partner-
ship interest.'11 Thus, partnership liabilities are symmetrically ac-
the aggregate concept by imposing the income tax on the partners, not on the partnership
itself. Additionally, the idea that income and deductions flow though the partnership con-
duit to the individual partners is an aggregate concept.
Section 741 of the Code provides that gain or loss on the sale of a partnership interest is
treated as arising from the sale or exchange of a capital asset. Thus, the Code views the
interest in the partnership entity as property that is transferable similar to corporate stock.
Id. (citations omitted).
97. W. McKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, supra note 75, at 6.03[6].
98. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1982).
99. Id. § 1001(b).
100. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(4)(v) (1982). More specifically, an example in section
1.752-1(d) of the Treasury Regulations illustrates that the amount a partner realizes from
the sale of his interest is increased by his share of partnership liabilities transferred. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(d) (1982).
101. See supra note 83.
102. I.R.C. § 722 (West 1982 & Supp. 1984).
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counted for on both sides of the gain or loss equation. The basis of
a partnership interest ordinarily consists of the value of property
contributed, 10 3 less any distributions, 104 plus the distributive share
of partnership income or loss.10 5 Any increase in partnership liabil-
ities is treated as a contribution of money by the partners, thus
increasing their basis under section 722.106 Conversely, any de-
crease in partnership liabilities amount to a distribution of money
to the partners which decreases their basis under section 733.107
These provisions provide the statutory base for determining the
appropriate tax treatment of a transfer of a partnership interest.
Integrating these provisions with other specific partnership provi-
103. Id.
104. Id. § 732.
105. Id. § 705(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1984).
106. Id. § 752(a). The partner is "contributing" to the partnership by assuming liability
for his share of the additional partnership liabilities. The House Report on the Internal
Revenue Act of 1954 stated:
Section 752. Treatment of certain liabilities:
Frequently, a partner will assume partnership liabilities or a partnership will
assume a partner's liabilities. In some cases this occurs as the result of a con-
tribution of encumbered property by the partner to the partnership or as the
result of a distribution of such property by the partnership to the partner. The
provisions of this section prescribe the treatment for such transferred liabili-
ties. Whenever a partner's individual liabilities are increased because of the
assumption by him of partnership liabilities, the amount of the increase shall
be treated as a contribution of money by the partner to the partnership. Simi-
larly, when the liabilities of the partnership are increased, thereby increasing
each partner's share of such liabilities, the amount of the increase shall be
treated as a pro rata contribution by the partners, thereby raising the basis of
each partner's interest in the amount of his share of the increase.
Conversely, when a partner's personal liabilities are decreased because a por-
tion of them have been assumed by the partnership the amount of the de-
crease shall be treated as a distribution of money by the partnership to the
partner. Similarly, when the liabilities of the partnership are decreased,
thereby decreasing each partner's share of such liabilities, the amount of the
decrease shall be treated as a pro rata distribution by the partnership, thereby
reducing the basis of each partner's interest in the amount of his share of the
decrease.
The transfer of property subject to a liability by a partner to a partnership,
or by the partnership to a partner, shall, to the extent of the fair market value
of such property, be considered a transfer of the amount of the liability along
with the property.
H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A236 (emphasis added), reprinted in 1954 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4017, 4376-77.
107. I.R.C. § 752(b) (1982).
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sions is the better way to address the Jackson problem.
ANALYSIS OF Jackson
An analysis of Jackson requires an understanding of the liabili-
ties of the parties in relation to the joint venture and the banks.
Even though the joint venture made the payments, Jackson re-
mained primarily liable to the Wells Fargo Bank because he per-
sonally signed the loan agreement.
The joint venture's books reflected the balance of the note as a
liability and the joint venture's payments extinguished the debt.'
Additionally, the joint venture agreement provided that the loan
was for joint venture purposes and constituted a joint venture obli-
gation. The banks received no notice of the agreement because the
agreement was not written when the parties obtained the loan.
Therefore, under California law, the joint venture agreement was
not effective against the banks. 10 9
The larger, $795,000, loan from Gilbralter Savings & Loan was
signed both by Jackson and by Del Castillo in their capacity as
presidents of HSI and LEI respectively. 10 As with the Wells Fargo
loan, the bank was not aware of the joint venture agreement and
had no reason to know that HSI was acting merely as Jackson's
agent."' Agency law in California provides that an agent is respon-
sible as a principal when a lender extends credit to him personally
without knowledge of any agency relationship."2 Because HSI ac-
ted as an agent for Jackson, the agency relationship rendered HSI
primarily liable on the Gilbralter obligation. Jackson assumed sec-
ondary liability as guarantor by his personal endorsement. 113
Nevertheless, the written agreement between the joint venturers
acknowledged that the loans were on behalf of the joint venture
and constituted a joint venture obligation." 4 The joint venture
agreement governed Jackson's transfer of the loan proceeds to the
108. Jackson v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. at 1413.
109. Id. at 1421 (citing CAL. CIv. CODE § 1624(2) (West 1954)).
110. Jackson, 42 T.C.M. at 1414.
111. Id. at 1421.
112. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2343 (West 1954).
113. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERI-
CAL CODE § 13-12 (2d ed. 1980).
114. 42 T.C.M. at 1414-15.
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joint venture and dictated that the joint venture assume liability
among the venturers for repayment of the loans. The distinction
between Jackson's continuing potential liability to the lenders and
his relative liability within the formal partnership structure is crit-
ical to unraveling the attempts of the Tax Court and the Ninth
Circuit to solve Jackson.
The Commissioner determined that a taxable sale or exchange
occurred on the transfer of Jackson's joint venture interest to HSI
because HSI concurrently "assumed" Jackson's liabilities.115 Jack-
son argued that no taxable event occurred upon transfer of his in-
terest in the joint venture to HSI because HSI assumed no joint
venture liabilities. Accordingly no reduction of his share of liabili-
ties occurred and no income was realized." 6 Jackson based his ar-
gument on three assertions. First, he asserted that the formation of
the joint venture relieved him of liability on the Wells Fargo loan
because the joint venture became solely liable. Thus, he was not
relieved of the Wells Fargo liability when he transferred his joint
venture interest because the joint venture held and retained the
obligation before and after the transfer. Second, Jackson argued
that because he personally had guaranteed the Gilbralter loan, HSI
could not legally assume the loan. Finally, Jackson contended that
the transfer of his partnership interest to HSI was a non-taxable
capital contribution of a partnership interest to a wholly owned
corporation." 7
The Tax Court analyzed the problem in two steps. First, the
court determined whether Jackson's joint venture interest actually
was transferred so that HSI replaced Jackson as a joint venturer.
Second, the court analyzed whether Jackson was relieved of his
share of the joint venture liabilities, triggering the rules concerning
a taxable sale or exchange.18
The Tax Court held that HSI became a new partner in the joint
venture with a capital interest and an interest in the profits.1 9 The
facts indicated that Jackson purposely transferred his interest to
115. Id. at 1418.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Relief from liability constitutes amount realized. If the relief from liability exceeded
Jackson's basis in the joint venture, the excess would be taxable gain.
119. 42 T.M.C. at 1420.
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sever his direct relationship with the joint venture. 2 ' Further, HSI
and Jackson agreed that HSI would assume Jackson's place in the
venture and would include all income from the venture in its in-
come. HSI exercised control over the joint venture and, most im-
portantly, the joint venture agreement expressly stated that the as-
signees of the partnership interests assumed the obligations of the
original parties to the agreement.' 2 ' In short, the transaction went
far beyond a paper transfer; HSI's role as a joint venturer was
substantial.
The Tax Court then analyzed the status of the transfer as a sale
or exchange under section 741.122 The court rejected Jackson's ar-
gument that no consideration existed because he was not relieved
of personal liability. The court stated that although Jackson re-
mained potentially liable to Gilbralter on the $795,000 note, the
joint venture agreement made HSI responsible for repayment. 123
As a result, Jackson's liabilities decreased, and this decrease was
adequate consideration to support a taxable sale or exchange. The
Tax Court held, therefore, that a taxable sale or exchange occurred
based on HSI's assumption of a share of joint venture liabilities. 124
Gain was recognized to the extent that the amount realized on the
transfer exceeded Jackson's basis in his partnership interest. 12 5
The Tax Court rejected Jackson's argument that the joint ven-
ture assumed the Wells Fargo obligation, thereby relieving him of
liability at the time of its formation rather than when he trans-
ferred his partnership interest. 126 The court ruled that, under Cali-
fornia law, Jackson's primary liability as maker of the note did not
120. Id. at 1415.
121. Id. at 1414 (referring to section 1.26 of the joint venture agreement).
122. Id. at 1420-23. Section 741 of the Code states:
In the case of a sale or exchange of an interest in a partnership, gain or loss
shall be recognized to the transferor partner. Such gain or loss shall be consid-
ered as gain or loss from the sale or exchange of capital asset, except as other-
wise provided in Section 751 (relating to unrealized receivables and inventory
items which have appreciated substantially in value).
I.R.C. § 741 (1982).
123. Jackson, 42 T.C.M. at 1421-22.
124. Id. at 1423.
125. Id. The $18,111 recognized gain related exactly to Jackson's allocated share of part-
nership loss claimed on his 1972 income tax return.
126. Id. at 1421.
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end when the joint venture agreed to pay the loan.127 The court
characterized Jackson's original contribution of the loan proceeds
to the joint venture as a loan to the joint venture, creating a joint
venture liability to Jackson.128 Accordingly, Jackson's liabilities did
not decrease when he signed the joint venture agreement because
the decrease in his personal liability on the loan was offset by the
increase in his share of the joint venture's liability on the note
under section 722 and 752(a). When Jackson transferred his joint
venture interest to HSI, his relief from liability within the joint
venture at that time constituted an amount realized subject to
taxation.
Although the Tax Court's decision may have been correct, its
reasoning wa unclear. The court recognized that the transaction
should be viewed within the partnership context, 129 but then ap-
plied a mixed analysis. The court focused on the notion that a re-
lease from liability created gain. This view explains the court's
characterization of the transaction as a liability arising "due to
Jackson" upon his transfer of the loan proceeds to the joint ven-
ture, i s° rather than as a capital contribution.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed the Tax Court, holding that no taxable transaction had oc-
curred because Jackson remained liable on the loans and because
he had received no other consideration' 31 The court was misled by
Crane's economic benefit fiction. In the court's mind, Jackson's
continued potential liability, both on the Gilbralter loan due to his
personal guarantee and on the Wells Fargo loan due to his effective
status as guarantor, prevented any economic benefit from accruing
to him. Because the court could not find any concrete economic
benefit nor any other substantive consideration running to Jackson
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1422.
129. Although primary liability to pay the Wells Fargo loan remained with Jack-
son, a collateral agreement was formed between Jackson and the joint venture
when the joint venture agreed to make the loans obligations of the joint ven-
ture. Such a collateral agreement is permitted under California law as between
the joint venture and the joint venturers as individuals, although the joint ven-
ture could not replace the parties to the primary loan.
Id. at 1421. The Gilbralter loan was treated similarly.
130. Id. at 1421.
131. 708 F.2d 1402, 1404 (9th Cir. 1983).
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it failed to find a taxable transaction.132
The court erred by failing to distinguish Jackson's continued po-
tential liability to the lenders as a guarantor and his relief from
liability within the partnership context.133 Because the court was
concerned only with economic benefit, it focused too narrowly on
the Tax Court's recognition that Jackson technically retained per-
sonal liability on the loans.134 Consequently, the court ignored the
Tax Court's crucial ruling that the transfer to HSI represented suf-
ficient consideration because it relieved Jackson of liability in his
capacity as joint venturer.3 5
The court of appeals's decision was imprudent because it allows
partners to transfer their partnership interests free from any tax.
The court attempted to mechanically apply the economic benefit
rationale of Crane to the facts of Jackson. When a taxpayer trans-
fers an asset encumbered by debt, he should account for prior tax
benefits. Otherwise a taxpayer will have received both untaxed in-
come at the time the loan was extended and an unwarranted in-
crease in the basis of his property.
Crane's provision for large depreciation deductions through the
inclusion of debt as a part of basis elated tax shelter investors. But
Crane counterbalanced this depreciation by requiring the inclusion
of debt in the amount realized upon sale of the property. Thus,
taxpayers knew that when they disposed of their property, they
then would have to account for earlier tax benefits in the form of
taxable gain. Jackson effectively circumvents this framework. Re-
tention of some form of guarantor liability upon transfer of the
shelter's assets will enable tax shelter investors to dispose of their
shelters with no tax penalty. Similarly, on a narrower scale, part-
ners desiring a tax-free escape from tax shelters can contribute
property to a controlled corporation and not recognize taxable in-
come as long as they guarantee any note to which the property is
subject.
132 Id.
133. The court correctly asserted that Jackson could not be relieved by HSI of his liabil-
ity to the lenders. But HSI did relieve Jackson of his liability in his capacity as a joint
venturer. This relief produced sufficient consideration to trigger recognition of gain. See
supra text accompanying notes 98-106.
134. 708 F.2d at 1404.
135. 42 T.C.M. at 1422-23.
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A proper analysis of the transaction in Jackson should focus on
liability within the formal structure of the partnership, as gov-
erned by the joint venture agreement. This "formalistic" approach
at first may appear anomalous. Standard tax and accounting con-
ventions focus on the substance of a transaction rather than its
form. However, several sources support a formalistic approach in
the Jackson context.
In Jackson, both the Commissioner and the Tax Court analyzed
the transaction within the partnership structure.3 6 Additionally,
Raphan v. United States,'137 a recent Court of Claims case, held
that a partner is not individually allowed basis for a partnership
debt that he guarantees if the guarantee is outside the partnership
structure because it was not called for by the partnership agree-
ment.138 Revenue Ruling 69-223 also implictly suggests that the fo-
cal point for liability should be at the partnership level. 39
Considering the transaction within the joint venture context
more accurately reflects the substance of the Jackson transaction.
The joint venture agreement provided that the loans were obtained
for the benefit of the joint venture and that the joint venture was
obligated to pay the loans even though Jackson remained poten-
tially liable. The agreement also indicated that the agreement was
binding on the venturers' assignees. 40 Thus, HSI became a party
to the joint venture obligations.'M  Although still a party to the
debts, Jackson was not obligated to pay on the notes unless the
136. 42 T.C.M. at 1422, 708 F.2d at 1404.
137. 1983-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) T 9613 (Ct. Cl. 1983).
138. Id.; see also Block v. Commissionner 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 546 (1980); Brown v. Commi-
sioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 725 (1980) (holding that the partner's guarantee of partnership
debts did not entitle them to basis because the guarantee was not required by the partner-
ship agreement). The Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), directs the Treasury to prescribe regulations
concerning the inclusion of partnership liabilities in the basis of the partner's partnership
interests. The regulations will specify that a partnership debt for which a partner is person-
ally liable, either primarily or secondarily, whether in his capacity as a partner or otherwise,
is not a nonrecourse debt, and thus generally does not provide limited partners with addi-
tional basis for their partnership interests.
139. Rev. Rul. 69-223, 1969-1 C.B. 184.
140. 42 T.C.M. at 1422. Although the Tax Court stated that HSI assumed the partner-
ship liabilities upon receipt of Jackson's partnership interest, no evidence of this exists in
the written transfer agreement.
141. Id.
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joint venture ceased payment. Even then, Jackson could sue the
joint venture for breach of contract.
HSI's taking of the joint venture interest subject to the liabilities
was inconsistent with the assumptions underlying the tax treat-
ment of the transaction. Both Crane and section 752 gave Jackson
a basis in his partnership interest that included the debt under the-
assumption that, as a partner, he would be responsible for pay-
ment. Upon the transfer of his interest to HSI, Jackson was no
longer a partner in the joint venture, and HSI, not Jackson, was
obligated to pay off the liabilities unless insolvency occurred. The
relatively low probability of insolvency minimized Jackson's poten-
tial liability. 4 2 Because the underlying assumption of the provision
failed, Jackson should have included the outstanding liabilities in
his amount realized. Because the shelter had begun to produce in-
come, an arm's length transfer in the future was unlikely. Jackson
nonetheless transferred the shelter without tax. The court of ap-
peals thus permitted a tax-free escape from leaky tax shelters. 4 '
142. Guarantor liability traditionally has been considered de minimis for tax purposes.
See proposed Treas. Reg § 1.465-6(d) (guaranty of another person's note does not increase
the guarantor's amount at risk); cf. Santa Anita Consol., Inc. v. Comm'r, 50 T.C. 536 (1968)
(shareholder guarantee of bank loan to third-party does not represent contributed capital);
Tonopah & T.R.R. v. Comm'r, 39 B.T.A. 1043 (1939) (interpreting Treas. Reg. § 1.861-
2(a)(1) (1975) to mean that residence of the obligor, rather than that of the guarantor, is
dispositive for purposes of determining the source of interest income), rev'd on other
grounds, 112 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1940); I.R.C. § 453(f)(3) (1982) (third-party guarantee of
purchaser's note in an installment sale does not recharacterize the note as payment in the
year of sale).
143. Jackson's tax position after HSI pays off the loan raises an interesting issue. Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929), held that when a corporation dis-
charges legal obligations for the personal benefit of a shareholder, the shareholder realizes
income. Id. at 729. Maher v. Commissioner 469 F.2d 225 (8th Cir. 1972), held, in a similar
context, that a transferor receives no income until principal and interest payments are
made. Id. at 229. If applied to Jackson, Maher suggests that Jackson would not recognize
any income until HSI actually paid the loans through the joint venture.
Jackson, however, is distinguishable from Old Colony and Maher. As a shareholder in
HSI, Jackson would receive only an indirect benefit, relief from potential liability, when HSI
ultimately paid the debt. Jackson merely was relieved from an obligation that he may never
have been required to fulfill. The taxpayer in Old Colony benefited directly because his
employer paid his tax liability, thereby relieving him from the obligation. In Maher, the
taxpayer received income either upon assumption of the liability or subsequently when it
was paid. The issue was whether to tax the individual now or later. In contrast, if Jackson
escaped taxation when he transferred his joint venture interest, he would avoid taxation
entirely because he would never realize income on the transaction.
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SUGGESTED APPROACHES TO "SOLVING" JACKSON
When solving tax problems, courts should apply existing legisla-
tive provisions rather than create new judicial doctrines. Sections
351 and 752 of the Code provide better solutions to the problem
presented by Jackson. Section 752 specifically addresses partner-
ship liabilities and the transfer of a partnership interest. Section
351 concerns any transfer of property to a controlled corporation.
Crane includes liabilities assumed in a sale or exchange as part
of a seller's amount realized and a purchaser's basis.144 Section
752(d) explicitly extends this rule to sales or exchanges of partner-
ship interests.'45 Because partnership interests are treated in the
same as any other property interests, a purchaser's initial basis in
his partnership interest includes his share of partnership liabilities.
Increases in a partner's share of partnership liabilities increase his
basis; decreases in a partner's share of partnership liabilities de-
crease his basis. 46 When a partner sells or exchanges his partner-
ship interest, section 752(d) balances the taxpayer's account by
treating the seller's share of partnership liabilities as an amount
realized. 14 7 Section 752(d) applies directly to Jackson's transfer of
his partnership interest.
Jackson contributed no cash when the joint venture was formed.
His transfer of the loan proceeds constituted either a contribution
to the capital of the joint venture or a loan. 48 In either case, the
144. E.g., Crane, 331 U.S. 1; Tufts, 103 S. Ct. 1826.
145. Section 752(d) of the Code provides as follows:
SALE OR EXCHANGE OF AN INTEREST. In the case of a sale or exchange of an
interest in a partnership, liabilities shall be treated in the same manner as
liabilities in connection with the sale or exchange of property not associated
with partnerships.
I.R.C. §§ 752(a), 752(b) (1982).
146. Id. The rationale behind these provisions appears to be that a partner's acceptance
of an increased share of partnership liabilities is an obligation undertaken by the partner
that benefits the partnership in the same manner as a contribution of capital. Similarly, a
decrease in the share of partnership liabilities that a partner is responsible for is treated
analogously to a distribution of capital. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1 (1960).
147. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(1) (1980); Rev. Rul. 75-194, 1975-1 C.B. 80; Rev.
Rul. 74-40, 1974-1 C.B. 159.
148. The minutes of a special board of directors meeting stated that Jackson's transfer of
loan proceeds to the joint venture represented a contribution of capital. 42 T.C.M. at 1415.
The Tax Court's creation of a "due to Jackson" liability upon transfer indicated the court's
preference for viewing the transaction as a loan. Id. at 1421.
19851
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:317
transfer created a partnership liability.'49 Jackson's half share 5 ° of
the partnership liabilities created by the Gilbralter and Wells
Fargo loans provided him with a $422,450 basis in the partner-
ship.'51 The only change in Jackson's basis in his partnership inter-
est before the transfer to HSI resulted from the joint venture's
1972 operating loss. This loss decreased his basis by $18,111 result-
ing in an adjusted basis at the time of transfer of $404,339. Under
section 752(d), therefore, Jackson's gain upon transfer of his joint
venture interest should be calculated as follows:
149. If the transaction is viewed as a loan by Jackson, the joint venture is liable to him
for repayment of the proceeds. If the transaction is treated as a contribution of capital,
section 752 still would apply even though the joint venture failed to assume liability to the
lenders for repayment of the loan and Jackson remained liable as guarantor. See I.R.C.
§ 752 (1982). Section 752(c) expressly provides that liabilities to which property is subject
are considered to be liabilities of the property owner. See I.R.C. § 752(a) (1982). Addition-
ally, section 1.752-1(0 states that the amount of debt only can be taken into account once
for purposes of section 752, even though a partner may be separately liable in a capacity
other than as partner. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(f) (1960). These provisions, when read together,
make it clear that a liability to which property contributed to a partnership is subject, is
considered as a liability assumed by the partnership for purposes of section 752, notwith-
standing that the contributing partner remains personally liable for repayment of the obli-
gation. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(c) (1960).
150. Partners share recourse partnership liabilities in accordance with the ratio for shar-
ing partnership losses. Liabilities are classified as recourse if any partner is personally liable.
See supra note 4.
151. Under section 752(a) of the Code, Jackson's share of the additional partnership lia-
bilities is treated as a contribution of money to the partnership, increasing the basis of his
partnership interest under section 722 as follows:
50% SHARE OF PARTNERSHIP LIABILITIES
'/2 of the Gilbralter loan $397,500
1/ of the Wells Fargo loan 24,950
CASH CONTRIBUTED -0-
JACKSON'S INITIAL BASIS IN HIS
PARTNERSHIP INTEREST $422,450
See I.R.C. § 752(a) (1982).
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AMOUNT REALIZED FROM RELIEF
FROM LIABILITY AS JOINT
VENTURER ON THE:
Wells Fargo loan 24,950
Gilbralter loan 397,500
$422,450
ADJUSTED BASIS OF JACKSON'S
PARTNERSHIP INTEREST AT THE
TIME OF TRANSFER TO HSI 404,339
RECOGNIZED GAIN 18,111152
The major obstacle to analyzing Jackson under section 752(d) is
whether the transaction qualifies as a "sale or exchange." This in
turn depends upon whether Jackson's relief from liability was suf-
ficient consideration to make the transaction a sale or an exchange.
Some commentators and the Internal Revenue Service have advo-
cated interpreting section 752(d) broadly to include all dispositions
of partnership interests. 5 The strongest argument in favor of a
broad interpretation is that, when Congress enacted section 752(d),
Crane applied only to sales or exchanges. Crane now applies to a
broader range of transactions. M Therefore, courts should interpret
section 752 as a historical accident rather than as a deliberate at-
tempt to restrict Crane.
If section 752(d) is read narrowly and Jackson's transfer is not
considered a sale or an exchange, section 752(b) should determine
the tax consequences of the transfer. Section 752(b) treats a de-
crease in the partner's share of partnership liabilities as an auto-
matic distribution of money from the partnership to the partner. If
a partner receives a section 752(b) constructive distribution in ex-
cess of the adjusted basis of his partnership interest, the partner
152. A partnership interest is a capital asset, so any gain upon transfer is capital gain.
I.R.C. § 741 (1982).
153. 2 W. McKEE, W. NELSON, R. WHITMIRE, supra note 75, at 15.05[1][a]; Note, The
Tax Shelter Dilemma: Disposition of a Crossover Limited Partnership Interest, 43 CIN. L.
REv. 349, 359-64 (1974).
154. Transfers now include charitable contributions and intrafamily gifts. See, e.g., Treas.
Reg. § 1.1011-2(a)(3) (1972) (automatic realization of liabilities in connection with charita-
ble contribution); Rev. Rul. 75-194, 1975-1 C.B. 80; Rev. Rul. 70-626, 1970-2 C.B. 158.
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has a recognized gain under section 731(a)(1). 155
An analysis of the transfer under section 752(b) produces the
same result as the section 752(d) approach. Under section 752(b),
Jackson's relief from joint venture liabilities upon transfer of his
interest to HSI constitutes an automatic cash distribution to him
of $422,450. Section 731(a)(1) then requires Jackson to recognize
gain to the extent that the distribution exceeds the adjusted basis
of his partnership interest:
CASH DISTRIBUTION
UNDER SECTION 752(B) $422,450
ADJUSTED BASIS OF JACKSON'S
PARTNERSHIP INTEREST AT THE
TIME OF TRANSFER TO HSI 404,339
RECOGNIZED GAIN $ 18,111
As with the section 752(d) approach, this approach effectively bal-
ances Jackson's account with the Service by requiring him to in-
clude the amount of the debt in both basis and amount realized.
The third statutory alternative available is to regard Jackson's
transaction as a transfer to a controlled corporation under section
351.156 Revenue Ruling 81-38 held that the transfer of a partner-
155. Section 731(a)(1) of the Code provides:
In the case of a distribution by a partnership to a partner - gain shall not
be recognized to such partner, except to the extent that any money distributed
exceeds the adjusted basis of such partner's interest in the partnership imme-
diately before the distribution....
I.R.C. § 731(a)(1) (1982); see Rev. Rul. 74-40, 1974-1 C.B. 159 (a decrease in a withdrawing
partner's share of partnership liabilities constitutes a distribution).
156. Section 741 of the Code provides that in the case of a sale or exchange of a partner-
ship interest, gain or loss will be recognized to the transferor partner. I.R.C. § 741 (1982).
But section 1.741-1(c) of the Treasury Regulations refers to section 351 for nonrecognition
of gain or loss upon the transfer of a partnership interest to a corporation controlled by the
transferor. See Treas. Reg. § 1.741-1(c) (1980); Rev. Rul. 1981-1 C.B. 386.
Section 351(a) provides: "No gain or loss shall be recognized if property is transferred to a
corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock or securities in such corpo-
ration and immediately after the exchange such person or persons are in control (as defined
in section 368(c)) of the corporation." I.R.C. § 351(a) (1982). Section 368(c) defines "con-
trol" as the ownership of stock possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined voting
power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80 percent of the total number of
shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation. I.R.C. § 368(c) (1982). As a 100%
owner of HSI, Jackson was in control after the transfer to HSI for purposes of section
346
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ship interest is an exchange under section 351.157 Correspondingly,
if the liabilities to which the transferred property is subject exceed
the partnership basis for the properties transferred, the excess is
taxable gain under section 357(c).5 8 Both the Tax Court and the
Ninth Circuit recognized the availability of this alternative in
Jackson.1 59
Arguably, section 351 applies to Jackson's transfer of his part-
nership interest, even though no exchange of stock occurred, be-
cause the transfer was to a wholly owned corporation. The issuance
of new stock would have been a meaningless gesture because the
stock Jackson held at the time represented the total value of HSI's
assets.6 0 Using this approach, the liabilities to which Jackson's
partnership interest was subject exceeded the basis of the partner-
ship interest transferred to HSI, Jackson's wholly owned corpora-
tion, by $18,111. This excess is taxable gain under section 357(c).
These three statutory provisions-sections 752(d), 752(b) and
351(a)-provide alternative methods to calculate Jackson's taxable
gain upon the transfer of his partnership interest. Each approach
produces the same result. Section 752(d) is preferable because it
specifically addresses the transfer of partnership interests. If sec-
tion 752(d) is construed narrowly, however, the other two analyti-
351(a).
157. 1981-1 C.B. 386.
158. Section 357(c) provides in part:
In the case of an exchange to which section 351 applies.., if the sum of the
amount of the liabilities assumed, plus the amount of the liabilities to which
the property is subject, exceeds the total of the adjusted basis of the property
transferred pursuant to such exchange, then such excess shall be considered as
a gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset or of property which is not a
capital asset, as the case may be.
I.R.C. § 357(c) (1982).
159. 708 F.2d at 1405; 42 T.C.M. at 1423 n.20. The Tax Court chose not to pursue the
applicability of section 351 because it felt that it doctrinally had produced the same result
that would occur under section 357(c). The court of appeals failed to pursue a section 351
analysis. The court erroneously ruled that HSI did not assume liability and thus the liabili-
ties assumed did not exceed the adjusted basis of the partnership interest under section
357(c). As previously discussed, if the Ninth Circuit had focused on Jackson's liability
within the joint venture, rather than his retention of potential liability to the lenders, sec-
tion 357(c) would have applied to the transaction.
160. Commissioner v. Morgan, 288 F.2d 676, 680 (3d Cir. 1961). But see Abegg v. Com-
missioner, 50 T.C. 145 (1968) (issuance of stock in exchange for a capital contribution is a
prerequisite to applying section 351), aff'd, 429 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir. 1970).
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cal routes are equally acceptable. The court of appeals was side-
tracked by its mechanical application of Crane's economic benefit
theory. The propriety of taxing Jackson's transfer becomes clear,
however, under a balancing entry analysis. The simplicity and logic
of those statutory alternatives make them the appropriate methods
for calculating the tax.
CONCLUSION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit erred
in allowing Jackson to avoid taxation upon transfer of his partner-
ship interest. Jackson originally received the proceeds of the loans
tax free on the assumption that he incurred an obligation to repay.
Crane allowed Jackson to include the amount of the debt in his
basis for depreciation on the same assumption. Therefore, inclu-
sion of the outstanding debt in Jackson's amount realized is neces-
sary to balance the tax benefits he received. Otherwise, Jackson
will have received untaxed income at the time the loans were ex-
tended and will have obtained an unwarranted increase in the ba-
sis of his partnership intererst. The court disregarded the sub-
stance of the transaction by failing to analyze the transfer within
the partnership structure. Further, Jackson's retention of guaran-
tor liability is insignificant for income tax purposes. Jackson opens
the door for tax free escape from shelters that have begun to pro-
duce income. The Service and the courts should close the door
swiftly by applying existing statutory alternatives when analyzing
future transactions similar to that in Jackson.
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